Prospect theory is an empirical model of choice that stands as the leading alternative to rationality for explaining decisions under conditions of risk. While many still defend the assumption of rationality as an appropriate starting point for the construction of international relations theory -deterrence theory especially -there is growing support for models of international politics grounded in the actual capacities of real-world decisionmakers. This article accepts that standard depictions of deterrence incentives capture much of the essential character of deterrent relationships. However, it substitutes cognitive assumptions in place of traditional rational choice. Using prospect theory, the article reconsiders three typical deterrence games. The new model of military deterrence put forth unearths a set of conditions that are required for successful deterrence and uncovers a set of causes for deterrence failures that run counter to conventional understanding.
Introduction
Few decisionmaking environments are fraught with greater risk than the anarchy of the international system. The fact that bad foreign policy choices hold the potential for disaster (e.g. war) is alone justification for the considerable time spent by students of international politics on the logic of military deterrence. Most research on deterrence assumes that states are rational. Meanwhile, accumulating empirical evidence from laboratory experimentation suggests that decisionmakers systematically violate the strict behavioral expectations of rationality. As anarchy places state survival at risk, these findings from cognitive psychology similarly threaten international relations theory and support the growing call for new models of international politics grounded in the capacities of actual decisionmakers.
Initially developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) , prospect theory is an empirical model of decisionmaking that stands as the 'leading alternative to expected utility as a theory of choice under conditions of risk' (Levy, 1996: 179) . It is therefore well suited to a re-examination of deterrence. In contrast to rational choice, prospect theory finds that decisionmakers do not maximize in their choices, are apt to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains, and tend to be risk averse when confronted with choices between gains while risk acceptant when confronted with losses. Considerable research on prospect theory outside political science exists, and scholars studying international politics have recently taken it up. Still, the growing recognition that actors choose as prospect theory suggests, and not as our theories of deterrence often assume, has not yet forced a thorough review of deterrence theory and practice.
This article presents a new theory of deterrence that is grounded in the actual capacities of decisionmakers. It accepts the standard depiction of deterrence incentives while substituting a cognitive model of decisionmaking for rational choice. Using prospect theory as a cornerstone, three types of deterrence are reconsidered: mutual deterrence, unilateral deterrence, and extended deterrence. Prospect theory identifies a new set of conditions that are required for successful deterrence, and uncovers a new set of reasons for the failure of deterrence that run counter to conventional understanding.
The academic literature on deterrence is large, but the number of core arguments is small. This article addresses the core while setting aside the important body of work that extends or modifies the basic set of premises that constitute deterrence theory. 1 The purpose here is to return to the core and begin rebuilding a foundation that incorporates an empirically supported model of human decisionmaking. Accordingly, the argument addresses (and adopts) some of the simpler examples of game theory in the study of deterrence. Working at this elemental level is a necessary first step toward the full expression of a formalized theory of cognitive deterrence.
The argument below unfolds as follows. After a brief discussion of rationality and cognition, I present a short summary of typical concerns about traditional deterrence theory. Prospect theory is then introduced as an alternative foundation for understanding the dynamics of deterrence behavior. A general deterrence model is developed and then used to re-examine three common deterrence games. Finally, I highlight the unintended consequences of deterrence threats that are revealed under prospect theory but hidden by rational choice.
Relative Strengths: Rationality Versus Cognition
While the behavioral expectations of prospect theory differ from rational choice, prospect theory retains a principal advantage of rational analysis. Actor decisions are stable and predictable. Earlier psychological approaches to the study of international relations depended heavily upon the personal traits of individual decisionmakers, upon information flows unique to the decision set, or upon a unique group dynamic in the decision setting. 2 By contrast, prospect theory permits the construction of hypotheses that cut across contexts; it thereby coopts simplicity as the principal benefit of rational models. This is likely the reason for its growing recognition in political science.
Broadly, research on cognition and decisionmaking demonstrates that individual choices are as much a function of consistent heuristics and biases as they are the result of calculated costs and benefits. Prospect theory is part of this larger investigation into the structure of human choice. 3 It is the most well-traveled finding to emerge, and it has been successful at penetrating other fields in which human decisionmaking is important (e.g. political science and economics). Deviations from rationality are not treated as exceptions; they are instead important phenomena for which an explanation is possible. There is already considerable empirical evidence that journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 39 / number 2 / march 2002 166 1 Such extensions are too numerous to mention, but include topics like the logic of first strike (Wagner, 1991) ; deterrence in the developing world (Kraig, 1999) ; the potential value in promoting proliferation (Bueno de Mesquita & Riker, 1982) ; critiques of US policy (Jervis, 1984b) .
2 For a discussion of psychology and foreign policy decisions, see Vertzberger (1990) . For examples of psychology in the deterrence literature, see Lebow (1989) and Jervis, Lebow & Stein (1985) . 3 For a summary of the major findings, see Kahneman & Tversky (1982) and Bell, Raffa & Tversky (1988) . For a good non-technical summary of this literature, see Plous (1993). prospect theory can capture important aspects of state behavior (Levy, 1992; Farnham, 1994; Levy, 1996; Berejikian, 1997; Farnham, 1997; McDermott, 1998) , suggesting that it is a solid foundation from which to build a theory of deterrence.
Increasingly, the use of classic rationality as a foundation for international relations theory -or any political theory -is contested. Time constraints, huge amounts of information, and uncertainty, combined with cognitive limitations, make it difficult for foreign policy actors to evaluate all possible scenarios and make a universally rational choice. One response to this critique is that classic rationality can be replaced with 'satisfying' or a 'bounded' conception of rationality. The idea here is to utilize an assumption closer to the actual process of decisionmaking while retaining the benefits of rational choice models, namely their parsimony and predictive breadth. However, scholars in the field of deterrence have largely adopted a second position. This view argues that all theories are abstractions from a complex reality. What is important is not the truth of the assumptions imbedded in the theory but the explanatory power of the model. 4 But the explanatory power of rational choice explanations is itself often questioned. For example, Simon (1983) first noted that much of the explanatory work of rational models comes not from the 'Herculean' assumption that people strictly maximize, but from a rich set of auxiliary claims about what people want and how they view the world. Similar arguments are found in the international relations literature. The danger of emphasizing rationality lies in 'drawing attention away from the areas that contain much of the explanatory "action" in which we are interested' (Jervis, 1988: 325) . 5 This argument penetrated to the heart of political science. It lies, for example, at the center of Elinor Ostrom's Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, which challenged political science to develop a behavioral theory of collective action. According to Ostrom, theories of politics should be 'based on models of the individual consistent with empirical evidence about how individuals make decisions in socialdilemma situations' (Ostrom, 1998: 1) . The application of findings from cognitive psychology to the study of deterrence is consistent with Ostrom's call to the discipline. The most productive theories of politics will be those built upon the actual characteristics of individual choice.
Still, rational deterrence has established itself as a powerful anchor for both theory and practice, producing a framework that has 'dominated postwar academic thinking on strategic affairs' and lies at the core of the 'intellectual framework of Western military policy' (Achen & Snidal, 1989: 143) . Ultimately, some blend of rational and cognitive models will provide scholars with a comprehensive understanding of military deterrence. Recent developments in formal theory are suggestive. 6 Rational and cognitive deterrence can coexist as complementary pieces of a larger whole. For example, the model to be offered below treats threat credibility as exogenous: it is assumed that deterrence threats range from highly credible to largely incredible. Using formal tools, Nalebuff (1991) demonstrates that a central component of threat credibility lies in rival perceptions about the hidden costs of action. The lower the hidden costs, the greater the actual strength of a state and the greater its willingness to implement threats. The key to maintaining credibility is the proper manipulation of rival perceptions about hidden costs through the judicious use of threats and aggression. Too much or too little of either
can damage a state's reputation and invite aggression. This model of credibility formation and maintenance thus supplies important pieces of the larger deterrence puzzle not provided by cognitive deterrence. Conversely, cognitive deterrence can fill gaps existing in some formal models. Fearon's (1994) interest-signaling model suggests a sequence game wherein challengers select themselves into or out of deterrence crises. Interestingly, defenders with solid reputations will nonetheless often fail to deter highly motivated challengers, a finding confirmed by the analysis below. However, the origins for motivation in the signaling model are exogenous: states are assumed to possess high or low levels of motivation. Under the framework of cognitive deterrence offered here, a state's motivation will be explained by its level of risk acceptance. More immediately, the question posed by cognitive psychology to the study of international politics is compelling. Rather than asking if traditional rationalist assumptions are useful for theory construction, we should ask whether or not it still makes sense to continue with a model of choice that we know to be beyond the capacity of real-world actors. The question becomes more pressing given that we have at our disposal cognitive models that are in fact accurate descriptions of the actual process of decisionmaking.
Problems with Deterrence Theory
The logic of military deterrence is commonly depicted as a game of chicken. 7 Here each state has two choices. The first is to support the status quo through cooperation. The second is to overrun the status quo through military action. The universe of possible outcomes is given in Figure 1 . If both cooperate, the status quo continues. If one state defects, deterrence has failed. If both defect, war is the result. The standard assumption is that each side prefers an advantage over its rival to the cooperative status quo, though each prefers the status quo to open conflict. Stripped to its core, successful deterrence rests in effectively communicating a willingness to impose heavy costs upon a rival if it pursues unacceptable policies.
The dilemma for states in such games is that each has an initial incentive to move off the status quo. This undermines the credibility of deterrent threats because 'having to carry out this threat if deterrence fails hurts the threatener, even though the threat itself is what is supposed to prevent deterrence from failing in the first place' (Brams & Kilgour, 1988: 46) . We should then observe an immediate race to defection by both states because the first to defect gains a strategic advantage. But deterrence often does work. In response, proponents of traditional deterrence theory offer several explanations for the stability often observed in deterrence relationships.
One line of reasoning holds that states can deliver credible commitment threats. States rationally commit to a deterrent strategy if in the long run such a commitment brings a higher expected payoff than no commitment. The assertion boils down to the following:
It is rational to execute the intention [to retaliate] if and only if it is utility maximizing to form it. From this follows that since it may be rational to form the intention to execute the threat, it may also be rational to carry it out journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 39 / number 2 / march 2002 168 7 While this metaphor is commonly associated with deterrence, other incentive structures may also capture the dynamics of deterrence games. For example, Zagare (1987) suggests that deterrence games are best represented by the prisoner's dilemma. For simplicity of presentation, the game of chicken will be assumed throughout. . . . . if the intention has been formed, and deterrence fails, then a rational agent who intends to retaliate should do so because acting upon this intention is part of the behavior required of an expected utility maximizer. (Zagare, 1990: 252) The argument here is that deterrence succeeds when both states are able to communicate the fact that each intends to undertake action that is irrational at the time it must be taken, but rational at the time the commitment is made. Many find this an unsatisfying solution that clouds rather than clarifies the logic of deterrence. If deterrence should fail, 'it is irrational to retaliate, even on a probabilistic basis, because retaliation leads to a worse outcome for the threatener, having to carry out his threat, as well as for the player who preempted and thereby provoked retaliation' (Brams & Kilgour, 1988: 46) . 8 Alternatively, states might deploy a tripwire as a signal of resolve in order to increase the credibility of deterrence threats. However, the comparatively small losses incurred by sacrificing the tripwire troops should not, under rational deterrence, lead to a decision to accept the much larger costs of war. 9 Others suggest that states can form preferences for irrational actions -like responding to an attack -and that once formed such preferences are usually carried out (Gauthier, 1984) . Critics correctly note that this opens a Pandora's box wherein states are free to create preferences for all kinds of irrational goals. Once states are permitted irrational goals, there are no theoretical restrictions on the sort of irrational behavior they can undertake. The deductive power of deterrence theory rests in the assumption that states are rational; without that assumption, prediction is lost.
Similarly, empirical studies have produced widely different results and little or no consensus on a set of variables that predict successful deterrence (Jervis, 1989; Harvey, 1995) . Early findings demonstrated that the relative size of the threatening state is of little importance. Military inferiority is not a sufficient deterrent (Zinnes, North & Koch, 1961) . Indeed, evidence suggests aggressors often understand that they are militarily inferior, that they would lose an all-out war, and that aggression on their part significantly increases the probability of a war (Russett, 1967) . One possible explanation is that defender states will sometimes fight to manipulate their reputation for toughness. However, there are theoretical reasons to believe that such attempts are likely to prove counterproductive (Jervis, 1984a) , and empirical results confirm that states that have fought in the past are no better at deterring rivals then those states that have not (Huth & Russett, 1984) . Additionally, many factors associated with deterrent behavior are themselves not often predicted by the theory. For example, the greater the level of target dissatisfaction with the status quo, the less effective deterrence threats are. One explanation is that dissatisfaction offsets 'perceptions of insufficient capability', thus leading to aggression even in the case where smaller states face more powerful rivals (Zinnes, North & Koch, 1961: 470) . But contemporary deterrence theory would deny this result. A state dissatisfied with the status quo should not, under rational deterrence, undertake a course of action that would cause further deterioration or decline in position.
Most deterrence scholars argue that an empirical consensus will follow with further theoretical development (e.g. Achen & Snidal, 1989) , and agreement over the operationalization of key terms (e.g. Huth & Russett, 1990) . Meanwhile, critics remain
convinced that deterrence theory must be recreated, rather than simply patched, if it is to provide important guidance to states hoping to avoid conflict (George & Smoke, 1989; Lebow, 1989) . The growing call for behavioral theories of politics firmly grounded in the actual capacities of realworld decisionmaking, combined with the theoretical and empirical difficulties found in standard deterrence theory, suggests the need for a reworking of military deterrence theory along cognitive lines.
Prospect Theory
Critics of contemporary deterrence theory also argue that often states simply fail to make rational choices. Empirical work supports this claim (Jervis, Lebow & Stein, 1985) . For some, this suggests that the foundations for rational deterrence theory are suspect, while others argue that any deductive model of deterrence is inherently flawed (Steinbruner, 1983) . However, that second position is correct only if non-maximizing behavior is random, so that deterrent threats elicit no predictable response from the target and therefore that states have no way to establish a good strategy. Indeed, both supporters and critics of deterrence theory tend to equate non-rational behavior with unpredictable choices. By contrast, prospect theory suggests that non-rational choices are both stable and predictable. This makes a deductive theory of deterrence possible. The cornerstone for prospect theory lies in the observation that, subjectively, there is a diminishing return to continually increasing gains. For most people, an initial windfall of $1,000 is more highly valued than is the same $1,000 when added to an initial gain of $10,000. That is, the value function for individuals with respect to gains is concave, representing a curvilinear relationship between increasing gains and subjective value. A similar relationship exists for losses such that the value function for losses is convex. The principal distinction between prospect theory and rational choice lies in this asymmetrical relationship between gains and losses. Expected utility theory holds that decisionmakers evaluate the desirability of outcomes against their net asset position, and have a single function against which both gains and losses are evaluated. By contrast, the core finding under prospect theory is that decisionmakers evaluate each choice anew and against a neutral reference point (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980) . Rather than a single utility function against which all outcomes are evaluated, decisionmakers instead have two such functions, one for gains and one for losses.
This relationship is given in Figure 2 . The graph's origin represents the reference point against which gains and losses are evaluated. The s-shaped form of the value function captures the diminishing relationship between objective gains and losses with subjective value. Note also that the value function for losses is steeper than for gains. Losses hurt more than a gain feels good, or as Kahneman and Tversky put it, this steeper losses curve reflects the 'observation that a loss has a greater subjective effect than an equivalent gain' (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982: 166) .
There are two important implications of this model for the study of international politics. The first is the so-called framing effect. The essentials of framing can be described with an example lottery.
• Gains frame: Imagine a choice between two options that imply personal gains. This finding is quite robust. Studies deliberately designed to refute it have reconfirmed the basic result (Grether & Plott, 1979) . Termed preference reversal, this flip in preferences is not predicted under rational choice because it violates the principle of invariance. It should not matter how prospects are framed; under rational choice, individuals ought to be consistent in their preferences no matter how they are presented. Because expected utility theory assumes that individuals evaluate gains and losses against net asset positions and along a single utility function, it predicts that individuals might be either risk averse or risk acceptant across choices, but not both.
Preference reversal also breaks with the rational model in that the decisional determinant is not the expected outcome, but how the choice is perceived relative to the status quo. Individuals do not maximize even when they have perfect information. Indeed, in an important sense, objective outcomes become unimportant because 'the same decision can be framed in several different ways and different frames lead to different decisions' (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982: 165) . Figure 3 plots the s-shaped utility function over the set of gains for the hypothetical lottery given above. Notice that in the gains quadrant, an individual would prefer a sure gain of $80 to an 85% chance to win $100. 10 Prospect theory predicts, and Figure 2 , the negative value of a $500 loss is subjectively greater than the positive value of an equivalent gain. Loss aversion implies that decisionmakers will act more aggressively to avoid a loss than to secure an equal gain, and will pursue loss aversion beyond a rational expectation of benefits. The tendency here is to place a greater value on that already possessed compared with equivalent goods not yet acquired. This finding is consistent with an observed endowment effect, which is also supported empirically. Here, individuals consistently overvalue that which they already possess such that the endowment effect 'enhances not the desirability of what one owns, but the pain of forsaking it' (Nincic, 1997: 99) .
Prospect theory thus models the subjectivity of actual decisionmaking. An individual's attitude toward risk is not simply a function of expected outcomes. Rather, risk disposition is influenced by 'whether the outcomes are perceived as gains or losses' relative to a reference point (Quatrone & Tversky, 1988) . The important idea here is that our theories of deterrence lag behind our knowledge of human decisionmaking. Risk acceptant and non-maximizing behavior is not integrated into models of deterrence, despite the fact that this is sometimes how decisionmakers act. For example, under prospect theory, the deployment of deterrence threats can have several unintended consequences that are not predicted by rational deterrence. Credible threats might generate a losses frame for the target state and thereby push it into risky behavior. The target of a threat might then risk breaking off negotiations when the threatening state was simply attempting to secure a better deal. Or, threats may induce the target to attack even if there is only a low probability of success. This is exactly the sort of behavior the initial threat was intended to deter. All of this is explored in detail below. The point here is that our understanding of decisionmaking under risk is quite different with prospect theory as the assumed model of choice.
Deterrence and Decision Frames
The framing effect identified under prospect theory suggests that state assessments about the attractiveness of the status quo play a central role in explaining deterrence behavior. If continued mutual deterrence is acceptable, then states confront a choice between selecting the known benefits of the status quo or pursuing a gamble intended to further improve their position through defection. When this gamble contains an expected value of further gain but also some probability of loss (i.e. open conflict), the state would be in a gains frame. Prospect theory predicts that the state would forgo the opportunity to improve its position and opt for the certainty of the status quo. Conversely, a state operating under an unacceptable status quo also has an opportunity to improve its position through defection. When this gamble contains an expected value of further loss, but also some probability of approaching an acceptable status quo, the state would be in a losses frame. Prospect theory predicts that the state would accept the gamble.
This produces a general theorem for deterrence: deterrence is more likely to be effective when both states are in a gains frame, and less likely to be effective when either or both are in a losses frame. Under gains, a state will not risk disturbing the status quo even if the expected value of defection is greater than continued cooperation, so long as there is also some smaller probability of loss. This means that under a gains frame, even less than perfectly credible deterrence threats will provide a sufficient deterrent. By contrast, in a losses frame, states will risk defection even if the expected value of this strategy is less than continued cooperation, so long as there is a chance that this course of action will return them to a condition of normalcy.
Prospect theory does not predict the content of the decisional frame, that is, whether a state views the status quo of deterrence as acceptable or unacceptable. A state's assessment of the status quo is an empirical question. As a guide, one could look to recent changes in a state's strategic condition. Assuming a near-perfect correlation between a state's objective condition and its perception of that condition, changes in the status quo would then provide a guide to the content of the decisional frame. 11 However, decisionmakers also possess unique worldviews. Documenting the content of the frame therefore requires evidence about the state's actual condition and a reconstruction of decisionmaker perceptions. Political subjectivity thus plays an important role in an analysis using prospect theory. The possibility of a cognitive frame -that is, where only the perception of the state is operative regardless of objective circumstances -is consistent with the observation that the reference against which outcomes are evaluated is the condition to which 'one has become adapted' and that there are many cases in which it is
11 Depending upon the nature of change, a gains or losses frame will exist for some period after change has occurred. The speed with which updating takes place, that is, 'how long one retains an original point of reference' in assessing the value of recent change, is an important question for prospect theorists, but one that is little understood (Shafir, 1992: 316) . Jervis, for one, suggests that it takes longer to incorporate losses into the reference point than gains (Jervis, 1992: 200) . This tendency is at best a guide to empirical research, not an ironclad theory of updating. Ultimately, a state's assessment of the status quo is an empirical question; it cannot be pre-specified theoretically.
'determined by events that are only imagined' (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982: 171-172) . Thus, states may have a view of their circumstances that has few connections to reality. However, the existence of a purely subjective frame would require thorough documentation.
Prospect Theory and Deterrence

Mutual Deterrence
Traditionally, the incentives for a deterrence game like that given in Figure 1 are represented using ranked preferences. Unfortunately, ranking outcomes does not tell us if either state is satisfied with the deterrent status quo as is required for an analysis using prospect theory. The matrix tells us that mutual cooperation is preferred relative to unilateral cooperation and mutual defection, but not whether it is a set of conditions with which the state is ultimately satisfied. Instead of ranked preferences, interval payoffs allow the introduction of status quo assessments while retaining the incentive structure given in Figure 1 . This permits a direct comparison of traditional and cognitive deterrence. Consider Figure 4a . Cell payoffs depict state assessment of the various outcomes in comparison with what each perceives to be an acceptable condition. Positive values represent increases in satisfaction over an acceptable status quo. Negative values represent dissatisfaction with outcomes: the larger the negative number, the further a state is from an acceptable condition. We can now represent the same set of relationships given in Figure 1 and introduce the notion of a reference point. 12 In standard deterrence theory, open conflict is the worst possible outcome, and the one both sides wish to avoid most. It is possible then that states finding themselves here would view their condition as unacceptable. The value -1 given to this cell is meant to represent that it is unattractive compared with the deterrent status quo. Of course, a larger negative value would be possible, say, if we were comparing conventional deterrence to nuclear deterrence. 13 But this would not alter the underlying dynamics of the game. Figure 4b also represents the logic of mutual deterrence, only here the status quo of cooperation is unacceptable to both states. Consistent with the standard game, open conflict is worse still, while unilateral cooperation sits between open conflict and mutual deterrence. In this game, the only acceptable outcome for each state is unilateral defection.
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12 The transition to interval payoffs offered here retains the preference order for chicken games as given in Figure 1 . From this point forward, the analysis assumes interval payoffs for both cognitive and rational deterrence. Figure 4a . Mutual Deterrence in a Gains Frame Figure 4b . Mutual Deterrence in a Losses Frame 13 It has been suggested that at the extremes of 'very small probabilities or for catastrophic losses' the framing effect may break down because it is overwhelmed by the distribution of costs and benefits attendant to the choice set (Levy, 1995: 3) . In nuclear deterrence, it may be that the potential costs of aggression are so large that they do in fact overwhelm the framing effect. This raises an important distinction between total versus limited nuclear war as deterrents. The notion of a limited nuclear war suggests that the costs of conflict are not beyond consideration. Therefore, it may be that cognitive deterrence is appropriate for analyzing limited war deterrents while rational choice is a better guide to understanding total war threats. This issue clearly begs further examination.
Player X Cooperate Defect
This use of interval payoffs to represent deterrent games does not alter the conclusions reached by rational deterrence theory discussed earlier. The preference order in Figures 4a and 4b is identical, and both reproduce the traditional deterrence relationship given in Figure 1 . Specifically, each state has an incentive to defect first and impose a settlement upon its rival. Mutual cooperation is preferred to unilateral cooperation, and unilateral cooperation is preferred to open conflict. Finally, as before, deterrent threats have to overcome the fact that once a rival defects the best strategy is to capitulate.
Under prospect theory, the two games are quite different. In Figure 4a , both states are confronted with options implying gains and are therefore in a gains frame. Either may opt for the gains from the status quo, or gamble in an attempt to improve its position. 14 The current benefits under the status quo are known. Risk comes in attempting to improve one's position at the expense of the other. If successful, this strategy produces further gains. It also contains some chance of loss in the form of open conflict. The choice set is analogous to the example lottery given in the earlier discussion of prospect theory. States may select a certain smaller gain or gamble in an attempt to improve their condition.
Prospect theory predicts that when two states are in a gains frame (4a) they will have a relatively easy time crafting a stable deterrent relationship because the threshold for a successful deterrence threat is low. Under rational choice, if an aggressor calculates the expected benefits of defection to be larger than cooperation, that state will attempt to overrun the status quo. Under prospect theory, even if the expected benefits of defection are greater than cooperation, states in a gains frame will continue to cooperate so long as defection also risks losing the benefits enjoyed under the status quo. This follows from the empirical findings under prospect theory. States in a gains frame are risk averse. That is, they will accept certain smaller gains in favor of larger but less certain gains. Given the structure of deterrence games, no deterrent threat is ever completely credible. However, under prospect theory, even if we assume that each state views the deterrence threats of the other to be less than fully credible, so long as there is some (even small) chance that they will be executed, mutual deterrence will hold. As noted earlier, one of the dilemmas of deterrence is that the underlying incentives place the credibility of deterrence threats in doubt. Yet, deterrence often works. We begin here to see why. For states under a gains frame, deterrence threats need not be ironclad to prove effective because states are cautious and risk averse.
By contrast, in Figure 4b , neither state is satisfied with the status quo. The options facing these states are analogous to the hypothetical lottery discussed above for choices involving loss. Each state may opt for the smaller certain losses of the status quo, or it may gamble and risk further loss in an attempt to return to a satisfactory condition. Unlike 4a, states in this game are risk acceptant. They will defect even if the expected benefit from defection is less than the certain value of cooperation, so long as defection provides some chance of approaching an acceptable status quo. Deterrence relationships under conditions of loss are quite unstable. The risk acceptance that is generated by loss suggests that even highly credible deterrence threats are unlikely to be effective deterrents. This is in sharp contrast to states in a gains frame, against which less credible deterrents are sufficient.
Simply put, mutual deterrence is more likely to work when both states are in a gains frame than when they are in a losses frame. 15 This fully resolves the dilemma identified earlier in traditional deterrence: there should be a race to defection in deterrence games, but deterrence often works. Under prospect theory, the important independent variable that predicts the success or failure of deterrence is each state's level of satisfaction with the status quo. States satisfied with the status quo are not compelled to overrun it, as the traditional interpretation of matrix payoffs suggested. Stated this way, the findings of prospect theory sound like common sense, and this should be considered a strength of the approach. Prospect theory does not require the kind of conceptual stretching found in traditional theory -for example, the argument that rational states bind themselves to irrational deterrence commitments -in order to explain state behavior.
Unilateral Deterrence
Unilateral deterrence exists where one state is satisfied with the status quo and another is not (Zagare, 1987: ch. 3) . Using the same coding scheme as before, this relationship is displayed in Figure 5a . Here, X is the revisionist state while Y is the status quo power. The preference orders for each state follow the standard depiction of deterrence. Again, from the perspective of rational deterrence, there are no important differences between the dynamics of this game and those previous. While the interval payouts are no longer the same for each state, the order of preferences predicts that each has an incentive to impose cooperation by defecting first.
Under prospect theory, X and Y will each react to this game differently. Specifically, X will be more successful in deterring Y than Y will be in deterring X. Y is confronted with choices implying gains. It can either continue to enjoy the certain gains of the status quo or risk open conflict by attempting to impose unilateral cooperation. Because states in a gains frame are risk averse, Y will forgo an opportunity to improve its position, even if this strategy is expected to produce further gains, in favor of the certain smaller gains of the status quo. In short, Y's risk aversion will lead it to support continued deterrence.
Meanwhile, X is in a losses frame and has two options. It can continue to cooperate under an unacceptable status quo, or risk the even greater losses of open conflict in an attempt to impose unilateral cooperation upon Y. As X is in a losses frame and according to prospect theory risk acceptant, it is much more likely to attempt to override the status quo even if defection is expected to produce still greater losses than continued cooperation, so long as defection also contains the possibility of returning to an acceptable condition. Rational deterrence theory has demonstrated that the underlying structure of the game reduces the credibility of deterrence threats. Because deterrent threats are always less than fully credible, there is always some probability that Y will not retaliate. Stated differently, there is some probability that defection by X will produce an acceptable status quo. Confronted with a choice between certain smaller losses and a gamble that produces less certain but larger losses, and that also contains some small chance of producing gains, X opts for the gamble, and for this reason that deterrence journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 39 / number 2 / march 2002 176 15 One version of rationalist analysis provides similar predictions. The concept of mixed strategy equilibrium also predicts that deterrence is more likely to succeed in 4a than in 4b. In 4a, the mixed equilibrium for mutual cooperation is .44 while in 4b it is .11. Further theoretical development is required, however, to establish mixed strategy analysis as a useful tool in understanding actual deterrence choices. Mixed strategies are derived by solving for the probability of cooperative and non-cooperative plays that would make one's rival indifferent between offering cooperation and defection (Morrow, 1994: 86) . This seems to cut against the very definition of real-world deterrence, where the idea is precisely to convince the other side of the benefits of continued cooperation. Additionally, it is difficult to imagine an actual decisionmaker randomizing cooperation and defection choices along some probability distribution in order to establish a long-run mixed strategy. For example, this would mean that player X in Figure 4a would defect a third of the time regardless of the credibility of rival Y's deterrence threats.
fails. Under prospect theory, games of unilateral deterrence are like games of mutual deterrence under a losses frame in that they are unstable. Now, if X defects, Y is faced with the choice of capitulating or executing its deterrent threat. Initially, conditions favor X. Because Y is risk averse, it is less likely to risk open conflict in an attempt to return to a more favorable position. This line of reasoning leads to the same conclusion reached under a traditional interpretation of the matrix. When faced with rival defection, states will capitulate. However, states often execute their deterrence threats. An explanation under prospect theory is possible. Defection by X will change Y's assessment of the status quo. That is, the payouts in Figure  5a demonstrate that an attack by X will pitch Y into the upper right quadrant, and thereby into a losses frame. The choices facing Y now resemble the example lottery presented earlier for choices involving loss. Y can accept the certain losses in the new status quo that resulted from X's provocation, or it can retaliate. Retaliation involves a high probability of even further losses (the bottom right quadrant), but there is also the chance that the conflict might ultimately be resolved in favor of Y.
Defection in a unilateral deterrence game can therefore pitch the status quo state into a losses frame and induce risk-acceptant behavior: in this context, that means executing one's deterrence threats. Prospect theory thus resolves a second deterrence paradox: In the face of aggression, why would any state actually retaliate? Traditional theory suggests that states will act only if the expected value of retaliation is greater than capitulation. So, for example, the notion that states retaliate in the hope of a quick and favorable resolution has precedent in the development of rational deterrence theory (Zagare, 1987 : chs 2, 3). Also, as noted above, states might retaliate to establish reputations in future games. Prospect theory adds to this an understanding that retaliation is a risk-acceptant, nonmaximizing choice motivated by a losses frame.
While states do sometimes carry out their deterrence threats, they do not always do so. Consider Figure 5b . Here, the object of dispute between states -say, a piece of territory -has less strategic importance for Y than for X. Indeed, possession of the disputed territory is a necessary condition of an acceptable status quo for X, but this is not so for Y. Under these conditions, defection by X will not elicit retaliation from Y because it remains in a gains frame and is risk averse. It should be noted, however, that when targeted with aggression states might revalue outcomes. For example, a strategically unimportant concession may take on political importance if the government fears inaction will make the state look weak and unable to carry through with its commitments, or if domestic political dynamics places pressure upon the government to act decisively. An example of the former might be the position of NATO in the Kosovo crisis, and an example of the latter might be the position of Great Britain in the Falklands war. A state's
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Figure 5a. Unilateral Deterrence Figure 5b . Unilateral Deterrence Player X Cooperate Defect
reassessment of the status quo after loss may pitch it into a losses frame even though the state previously attached little importance to the issue. In summary, unilateral deterrence relationships are unstable. Revisionist states find the status quo unacceptable, and this produces risk-acceptant attempts to override the status quo through defection. Because deterrence threats are always less than fully credible, there is always some chance that defection by revisionist states will produce an acceptable status quo. There seems little that a status quo power can do to improve the effectiveness of deterrence threats leveled against risk-acceptant states. Incremental increases in credibility are likely to produce only marginal results. Prospect theory also identifies the conditions under which states will actually carry out their deterrence threats and when they will not. The chance of retaliation is greatly increased whenever aggression pushes rivals into a losses frame.
Extended Deterrence
Extended deterrence involves promising to defend an ally against aggression. The continuing US commitments to Europe, South Korea and Taiwan are examples of extended deterrence. The analysis above suggests that extended deterrence will be more effective when the target of deterrence is in a gains frame. Where the target views the status quo to be unacceptable and therefore becomes risk acceptant, extended deterrent relationships will be quite unstable.
Extended deterrence games pose unique problems and opportunities for patron states. Typically, patrons attempt to increase the credibility of extended deterrence threats by public ironclad commitments to their ally. These usually come with a statement of the vital importance of the ally to the patron's national security, and often include a significant commitment of military personnel on the ground as an expression of seriousness.
While these actions are intended to increase the credibility of an extended deterrent, they may also solidify an existing losses frame in the target. From the perspective of the target, patron support for rivals simply implies a greater security threat. Indeed, this is the point of extended deterrence. However, as demonstrated above, incremental increases in credibility and/or capacity are unlikely to prove compelling to states in losses frames so long as defection contains some chance of producing a satisfactory status quo. This possibility always exists in extended deterrence games because it is harder to convince rivals that one will come to the aid of another than it is to convince them that the state will defend itself directly.
Nonetheless, introducing a third party into deterrence games opens the possibility of altering the target's perception of the status quo from losses to gains, thereby improving the prospects for successful deterrence. This is especially the case where a larger, more powerful patron offers deterrence protection to a smaller ally facing a similarly sized rival. Powerful patrons can dedicate some of their considerable resources toward increasing the desirability of the status quo. Economic aid or development assistance can be leveraged to nudge the target of extended deterrence into a gains frame. An essential component of the Camp David peace accords was improving the desirability of the status quo to Egypt through economic assistance from America. Of course, the level of commitment required by the patron may prove prohibitive. The USA, for example, seems unwilling to enter into a series of Camp David agreements where it accepts a significant long-term economic commitment to states engaged in conflicts flung across the globe. Still, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the United Nations has become increasingly involved in peacekeeping. Presumably, the burden of incentives could be shared. Moreover, while modern crises have required extending journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 39 / number 2 / march 2002 multilateral deterrence threats against potential aggressors, recent experience in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, to name but a few, suggests that the use of extended deterrence threats is alone insufficient to prevent conflict. The analysis offered by prospect theory suggests that, in addition to these strategies, leaders should also attempt to alter the target's assessment of the status quo with inducements, and that this might reduce the need for actual military force. The US defense commitment on the Korean peninsula may provide an example. Historically, US strategy involved ongoing public commitments to defend the South against the North, and the placement of a military force on the ground. The USA has also imposed economic sanctions. All this is intended to create pressure for reconciliation with the South. However, as recent economic conditions in the North worsened, fears of open confrontation increased. Under prospect theory, this should be expected. The undeniable effect of sanctions is that they help create a losses frame and thereby riskacceptant behavior. Recently, it appears that US policy has taken a new tack. A string of agreements between the North and the USA -for example, to upgrade North Korea's civilian nuclear power facilities and to loosen somewhat the economic sanctions in exchange for commitments to halt the development of ballistic missile technologyif continued, hold potential to lead North Korea toward a more favorable reassessment of the status quo. If successful, North Korea will increasingly adopt risk-averse strategies in its dealings with the South, reducing the potential for conflict.
Deterrence Threats and Losses Frames
In addition to the deliberate manipulation of decisional frames, as discussed above, it is also conceivable that states inadvertently alter rival frames. Most importantly, cognitive deterrence opens us to the possibility that threats alone can produce a losses frame for the target state, pushing rivals into riskacceptant attempts to overturn the status quo.
It is canonical in the study of international politics that the natural result of one state's attempt to make itself more secure is the creation of a 'security dilemma' for rivals, making them less secure. Even seemingly defensive preparations, under the self-help logic of anarchic systems, create insecurity. In fact, the purpose of a potent deterrent threat under the traditional view is precisely to produce rival insecurity sufficiently compelling to deter unwanted action: to drain a state's confidence about its capacity to successfully undertake aggressive actions. Thus, rival insecurity should lead to conservative policy choices. Bold, risky attempts to revise the status quo bring forth the deterrent and result in a loss for the state attempting to gain an advantage. One popular argument in the traditional deterrence literature -a view often echoed in the public policy discourse on deterrence -is that more deterrent is better. A deterrent capacity so large that it 'swamps all misperceptions arising, for example, from cultural differences, individual idiosyncrasies, and the complexities of international politics' is best (Steinbruner, 1976: 227) . Under prospect theory, this doctrine of conservative planning, if it produces a losses frame where one did not previously exist, may well be the road to disaster. Consider again two states operating under the incentives described in Figure 4a . Here, both states find the status quo acceptable. If Y attempts to significantly improve its deterrence capacity, the security dilemma suggests that this act makes X feel less secure, leading to a reassessment of the status quo. One possible outcome is a shift to Figure 5a where X now views the status quo as unacceptable, is in a losses frame and risk acceptant, and therefore more difficult to deter.
Prospect theory thus forces a distinction between credible threats and effective military deterrence. The two may not always be the same. Traditional deterrence theory has identified many factors that affect credibility. They include the nature of political ties between rivals and/or allies, the level of economic interdependence between states, and past actions in similar circumstances. The utility of prospect theory is greatest in identifying the larger context within which credible deterrents are likely to work best. In this light, cognitive and rational theories support one another. Under both, credible threats are important. However, cognitive deterrence suggests that threats will be more effective, whatever their credibility, when the target of deterrence is not in a losses frame. The goal is to create credible threats but to avoid producing risk-acceptant behavior. Rather than ever more potent deterrents, an intermediate level of forces is best, sufficient to impose penalties on a rival while not increasing its tolerance for risk.
Perhaps the central empirical implication of cognitive deterrence is that a state's assessment of the status quo, its decisional frame, should be given greater attention. Typically, the credibility of threats is viewed to be the key independent variable explaining the success or failure of deterrence. Under cognitive deterrence, perceptions about the costs and benefits inherent in the status quo are at least as important a variable as threat credibility. The possibility that deterrence threats contribute to losses frames, and thereby produce the very behavior that they are intended to deter, is a matter that clearly calls for empirical investigation.
Conclusions
The strength of rational choice as an anchor for international analysis lies in the construction of an elaborate and sophisticated set of interrelated theoretical propositions about the dynamics of international relations that enjoy considerable empirical support. By contrast, prospect theory has not yet generated an integrated set of theorems about international politics that might rival rational choice. The purpose here is to construct a new set of propositions organized around prospect theory that apply to deterrence so that a systematic empirical comparison of the two perspectives is possible. It would be wrong to suggest that this or any single article replaces the impressive set of propositions already constructed under rational choice. Instead, the purpose here is to demonstrate that it is possible to construct a logic of deterrence with an empirically established model of decisionmaking in a way similar to that now standing as the significant achievement of rational analysis in the study of deterrence. The next step is an orderly empirical investigation of the propositions offered above.
Several empirical strategies are possible. The simplest is to examine prominent instances of deterrence failure to determine if the aggressor was in a gains frame or losses frame at the time deterrence collapsed. The problem with this approach is that it is vulnerable to spurious correlation. For example, we might observe aggression by a state that suffers under a losses frame, but if this behavior overlaps in time with a diminished rival deterrent, then it is impossible to determine which explanation -traditional or cognitive -is best. Figure 6 summarizes the predictions of cognitive and traditional deterrence by their key independent variable. Traditional deterrence theory argues that successful deterrence will continue so long as the capacity and credibility of each state's deterrence threat remains unchanged, and that deterrence is most likely to fail when the credibility of either state's deterrence threat diminishes. Prospect theory predicts that deterrence will continue so long as neither state slips into a losses frame. This produces four possible conditions for Figure 7 , which produces conditions under which the two theories provide exclusive predictions. Under a losses frame and an unchanged deterrent threat, prospect theory predicts conflict while traditional theory predicts continued cooperation. Under a gains frame and diminished credibility, traditional theory predicts conflict while prospect theory predicts continued cooperation. This case-selection strategy approaches the ideal of a critical test because it permits us to control for the influence of each independent variable. If we find that only one theory is predictive in each of these two conditions, then we can categorically rule out the other theory as a possible explanation.
There is some evidence that such an investigation would prove fruitful. The predictions from cognitive deterrence map onto some of the earlier-noted empirical findings in the deterrence literature. For example, the fact that powerful states often fail to deter weaker states does not threaten cognitive deterrence theory. When weaker states are in a losses frame, they will be risk acceptant and more prone to aggression. In addition, the finding that excessive bullying diminishes deterrence is also consistent with prospect theory. Conventional deterrence logic suggests that a hardline stance might be attractive to a state attempting to establish credibility, and therefore that such a strategy could be successful in imposing cooperation upon a rival. However, empirical results suggest that a 'firm-but-fair' stance is more effective (Levy, 1989: 111) . The fact that firm-but-fair works does not by itself condemn traditional deterrence. The point here is that prospect theory has an explanation for both the failure of bullying and the success of firm-but-fair. Between the two, bullying is more likely to contribute to a losses frame for the target and is therefore counterproductive. Bellicose diplomacy may increase the credibility of deterrence threats, but it may also lead the target to the conclusion that some form of hostile rival action is forthcoming regardless of concessions. The status quoupdated for highly probable rival hostility -is thus placed in a losses frame producing riskacceptant behavior. Firm but fair deterrent threats are less likely to generate this result, and thus are found empirically to be more effective. 
